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The inﬂuence of national administrative institutions on contemporary reforms has
often been noted but insufﬁciently tested. This article enriches the comparative per-
spective of administrative reform policies by focusing on four interrelated dimen-
sions: the choices of reformers, institutional constraints, timing and sequencing and
long-term trajectories. This article tries to determine whether most similar adminis-
trative systems exhibit analogous contemporary reform trajectories in content, timing
and sequence. By comparing the administrative reform policies of two ‘most similar’
Napoleonic countries, France and Spain, this article analyses the commonalities and
divergences of decentralisation, territorial state reorganisation, civil service reforms
and policies that focus on performance management and organisational design. The
article identiﬁes the ‘causal mechanisms’ that characterise the speciﬁc role of institu-
tions and considers both the role of context and the importance of policy
intersections.
Although the New Public Management (NPM) approach is often analysed
through the convergence doctrine, administrative reform policies in Western
countries have differed in content, orientation and timing since the early
1980s. States have experienced multiple long-term changes in the institutional
components of their bureaucracies: changes in their political-administrative
relationships through politicisation or professionalisation; changes in their
organisational forms by agenciﬁcation or mergers; changes in their intergovern-
mental relationships by decentralising or recentralising; changes in their civil
service systems; changes in their steering mechanisms through performance
management; changes in their processes of allocating ﬁnancial resources and
changes in their relationship to users and the broader public. Each of these spe-
ciﬁc reform policies corresponds to speciﬁc power relationships between actors
– reform promoters, veto players and other stakeholders – and to ad hoc insti-
tutional constraints. A comparative analysis of national systems shows that
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administrative reform policies change in content and timing. For instance, the
United Kingdom ﬁrst targeted the development of managerial tools through the
Financial Management Initiative (FMI) followed by the government structure
(by creating executive agencies), whereas Sweden initially favoured the
decentralisation of power to local authorities and the decentralisation of person-
nel authority to ministries and agencies under the Government Modernisation
Programme (1985).
This diversity of content over time raises comparative problems. Do these
multiple reforms show coherent patterns within a country and among ‘most
similar’ administrative systems? Or do they just have a speciﬁc logic and gen-
erate an indiscernible design of mixed trends? Several approaches deal with
comparative research.
The ﬁrst academic approach compares changes in speciﬁc policies: agen-
ciﬁcation (Verhoest et al. 2011); reform of civil service (van der Meer
2011); politicisation (Peters and Pierre 2004) and budgetary reforms (Wanna
et al. 2010). Because an administrative system juxtaposes several ‘institu-
tional arrangements’, issues and reform agendas (Bezes and Lodge 2007),
reform policies can be analysed separately. However, the analysis of separate
administrative changes does not allow for the development of an overall
mapping of the reform pattern that impacts on a national administrative sys-
tem because the different pieces of an administrative system ‘bind together’
and interact. Therefore, comparing changes among administrative systems
requires examining what content has been favoured in each country from a
general perspective.
A second comparative administrative method advocates an ‘event-centric
approach’ and compares ‘major episodes of public management policymaking’
in different countries. This approach helps to identify conditions of change
and sources of agenda setting, alternative speciﬁcation and decision-making to
ﬁnd ‘causal sources of political will and novelty in public management poli-
cies’ (Barzelay and Gallego 2010). This approach is helpful in identifying
change mechanisms and reveals the structural dynamics that generate change.
However, this approach also has some limitations. It overemphasises the most
visible administrative changes, it raises the problem of the national ‘signiﬁ-
cance’ of selected ‘reform episodes’ and it potentially introduces a restricted
view for analysing large changes while neglecting ‘low-proﬁle’ institutional
changes, such as layering, conversion and displacement, as identiﬁed by The-
len (2003). Our method favours an integrated approach to governmental
reform decisions on different issues to map the interrelatedness of administra-
tive changes.
A more ‘globally’ comparative approach for detecting state transforma-
tion has been developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) through the articu-
lation of ‘politico-administrative regimes’ (starting point), ‘trajectories’ (‘a
route that someone is trying to take’) and different models of ‘future states’
(NPM, neo-Weberian state and New Public Governance). This framework
helps to differentiate core NPM states that adopt marketisation and manage-
rialisation (United Kingdom or New Zealand), maintainers (Germany) and
modernisers that are either oriented towards managerialisation (France, Italy)
or participation (Finland, Netherlands, Sweden). Although useful in revealing
national administrative changes and identifying convergence and divergence,
this approach does not identify causal change mechanisms. Trajectories are
often expressed in an abstract and sometimes rather teleological way. The
approach does not show a preference for actors or their institutional con-
straints.
This article seeks to identify the speciﬁc mechanisms that link administra-
tive institutions and actor choices in context – i.e. situations in which other
factors may impact the same mechanisms differently. This study pays attention
to four interrelated dimensions: institutional choices, constraints, timing and
sequencing and the global trajectory of administrative reforms. Our goal is to
improve comparative explanations by identifying ‘causal mechanisms’ (Falleti
and Lynch 2009) that may be common to the ‘most similar’ Napoleonic coun-
tries: France and Spain. These countries were selected with the expectation of
ﬁnding similarities in reform content, timing and sequence order. Some of the
institutional features that were set up by Napoleon I in France between 1799
and 1815 and exported to Spain, Italy and Greece (Wunder 1995) have been
resilient over the long term in these systems, and these features may have
structural effects on the content of administrative reform. To consider the
French, Italian or Spanish administrative systems as ‘Napoleonic’ is a reduc-
tion of their institutional complexities because each country has idiosyncratic
elements; however, they share some relevant institutional features. In this
paper, we ask whether most similar administrative systems exhibit analogous
contemporary reform trajectories in content, timing and sequence order, and
have these common ‘Napoleonic’ features been dismantled or maintained in
the same way in each case?
Several scholars (Barzelay and Gallego 2010; Kickert 2007; Loughlin and
Peters 1997; Ongaro 2008, 2009; Peters 2008; Wunder 1995) have already
identiﬁed similarities between Napoleonic countries. The ﬁrst similarity is that
France (Rouban 2008) and Spain (Gallego 2003; Parrado 2008) lag behind
other countries in the implementation of NPM reforms. However, few empiri-
cal studies (except for Ongaro, 2008, 2009; Barzelay and Gallego 2010) have
tested how these institutional arrangements have inﬂuenced the content and
results of administrative reforms in ‘Napoleonic’ states. Our assumption is that
‘Napoleonic institutions’ are signiﬁcant for the analysis of contemporary
administrative reforms if attention is paid to their speciﬁc content, timing and
sequencing.
To answer these questions, in the ﬁrst part of this article we offer a theoret-
ical framework based on reform trajectories and timing. In the second part, we
analyse commonalities and divergences in the content and timing of decentrali-
sation policies, territorial state policies, civil service reforms and policies that
focus on performance management and organisational choices. Finally, the
concluding section discusses the main ﬁndings of the study in light of
‘Napoleonic’ legacies.
A Framework for Comparing Causal Mechanisms: Serial Choices,
Institutions, Timing and Trajectories
The inﬂuence of administrative institutions on contemporary reforms has often
been claimed but insufﬁciently tested. More broadly, Knill (1999) pointed at
the ‘ex ante’ impact of political-administrative structures in explaining varia-
tions in ‘administrative reform capacity’. Hood and Lodge (2006) examined
the possible links between the historical forms of ‘public service bargains’ and
the national features of public sector reforms. Finally, Pollitt and Bouckaert
(2011) also analysed national reform trajectories in different politico-
administrative regimes.
More speciﬁcally, scholars studying ‘Napoleonic’ countries (Kickert
2007; Loughlin and Peters 1997; Ongaro 2008; Peters 2008) have broadly
claimed a common pattern of reform content and a general resistance to
change. They have mainly relied on the large components of these systems
whose real inﬂuence is difﬁcult to grasp: the set of values (conceptions of
the state as an overarching entity), the cultural dimension (Jacobean organi-
sation, the ‘one and indivisible Republic’; technocratic policy style; the
direct imposition of state authority over citizens, the relative fragility of
constitutional regimes) and some structural elements (a politico-administra-
tive system, prefects, all-purpose elites). This article proposes a way forward
by identifying more speciﬁc commonalities and differences among Napole-
onic countries by mapping changes that consider causal mechanisms, reform
choices, the content, timing and order of these reforms and the global and
national trajectories of these reforms.
Firstly, our approach suggests that each country has experienced their gov-
ernment’s serial choices (and non-choices) of administrative reform policies, as
in other policies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Governments repeatedly shift
their attention by bringing in new expertise, formulations, content and interests
into the reform process. A way of comparing administrative reform patterns is
to track these evolving formulations and content over time. Our assumption is
that the content reveals the focus and choices of governments at a given
moment. Furthermore, when considered in series as a repeated chain of
decisions, the content is able to reﬂect the inﬂuence of administrative institu-
tions – i.e. the strong inter-linkages among collective actors over time related
to speciﬁc issues and upon speciﬁc rules and structures which have developed
through time in one country (Bezes and Lodge 2007).
Secondly, we emphasise the importance of timing and sequencing because
‘placing politics in time’ matters (Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009; Pierson
2004) because ‘when an event occurs may be crucial’ (Pierson 2000: 263) and
because they help to describe and compare changes in bureaucracies. Although
‘Weberian’ public administration has been challenged since the late 1970s, not
all countries followed the same ‘ﬁrst steps’. Thatcher’s government initially
developed the Financial Management Initiative in 1982, whereas France opted
for decentralisation and Sweden combined the decentralisation of powers to
counties and the devolution of HRM practices. These initial episodes have
been described as ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier 1991) in which insti-
tutional design choices were made by new political coalitions. The new pat-
terns ‘place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then
difﬁcult to alter’ (Pierson 2004: 135). The sequence of choices may predeter-
mine the alternatives that are available in the future. These alternatives are
partly due to the restrictions of options that result from the initial choices and
from the consequences and side effects of these ﬁrst choices. Falleti’s studies
(2005, 2010) on the decentralisation policies of Latin America illustrates how
certain choices at particular junctures placed states on speciﬁc reform trajecto-
ries. Following these arguments, we assume that initial choices and the
sequence of those choices may impact on the long-term transformation of
bureaucracies. Using Pierson’s argument, administrative reform policies are
institutions per se that may produce lock-in effects, change the distribution of
power among different actors, and develop constraints on future reform initia-
tives. Therefore the transformation process cannot be similar when countries
‘start’ by decentralising to local authorities or when they initiate an ‘agenciﬁca-
tion’ process. Paying attention to ‘ﬁrst moves’ is also likely to reveal the most
salient issues for an administrative system, possibly the initially most mutable
or vulnerable institution.
Thirdly, serial choices are not free of constraints and are inﬂuenced by
‘existing institutions’, e.g. robust rules (speciﬁc administrative legal orders,
bureaucratic recruitment and training organisations, the distribution of pow-
ers among the various levels of government, the division of labour and the
organisation of ministries and the like) and the interlinking of actors ‘play-
ing their games’ to maintain and reproduce these rules. Administrative insti-
tutions are a set of several co-existing institutional arrangements that
become essential parts of the administrative system and produce ‘legacies’.
These administrative institutions may structure dominant issues, discussions
regarding the design of reforms, and may also ‘ﬁlter’ environmental pres-
sures and external shocks, such as economic crises, European constraints or
international ideas. Institutional arrangements unequally distribute resources
among actors and can generate a status quo when veto players want to stop
changes that may endanger their positions of power. Institutions then gener-
ate survival mechanisms to avoid these reforms and lock-in effects. Institu-
tional arrangements offer different kind of ‘opportunities’ for change.
Certain institutional components of an administrative tradition may be less
entrenched or less tied to solid coalitions, and therefore more ‘mutable’
(Clemens and Cook 1999) and more easily targeted by reformers. Finally,
institutional arrangements offer repertoires for change. They embody logics
at work, legitimate values and rules, conceptions of the state and collective
action and, when associated with political systems, they can credibly frame
preferred forms of change. For instance, the style of French policy has been
traditionally described as a ‘heroic’ (Hayward 1973) or represented as a
‘crisis-related’ (Crozier 1963) mode of change associated with certain fea-
tures of French polity. This style relies on a combination of strong political
leadership, small circles of ‘functionally politicised’ top bureaucrats with
experience in diverse departments or the private sector and asymmetrical
relations between the parliament and the executive, in favour of the latter.
We searched for similarities and differences in terms of issues, content and
timing that could be linked to institutional inﬂuences in similar Napoleonic
countries. In other words, did Spain and France address the same reform
issues, challenge the same institutional components, share the choices and tim-
ing of administrative reforms and face similar vetoes in their reform processes?
The article focuses on how and through what mechanisms these historical
administrative institutions produce inertia and/or shape administrative changes
in the contemporary period. There are some caveats to this analysis: so-called
similar administrative systems do not have identical administrative institutions;
a national administrative system cannot produce one homogeneous effect
because it is not composed of a single piece – each system juxtaposes different
‘institutional arrangements’, each with their own temporal underpinnings
(Orren and Skowronek, 1994; Bezes and Lodge 2007) – countries with similar
administrative systems may possess different contexts (political and electoral
systems, welfare states and the like) that also affect administrative reforms; and
similar administrative systems may not be exposed to the same external
shocks.
Therefore, the inﬂuence of administrative institutions cannot be described
ex ante by considering the formal administrative institutions and their poten-
tial effects, as other scholars do for the Napoleonic countries (Kickert 2007;
Loughlin and Peters 1997; Ongaro 2008; Peters 2008; Wunder 1995), that
is, in terms of mechanisms of centralisation and uniformity, the differentia-
tion and superiority of administrative law, and the use of a corps system to
organise the civil service. No doubt that the institutions that were ‘invented’
in the early decades of the nineteenth century have been resilient over time
and have structured the main institutional arrangements of the French and
Spanish administrative systems. However, we begin by examining adminis-
trative reform policies to assess the extent to which existing institutions
structure their design (choice of content, scope of reform, indecision, blocked
issues, etc.). To do so, we rely on the ‘causal mechanisms’ perspective
developed by Falleti and Lynch (2009). They focus on the interaction
between causal mechanisms and the context in which they operate. Accord-
ing to Falleti and Lynch, causal mechanisms are ‘relational concepts’ that
describe the
relationships or the actions among the units of analysis or in the cases of
the study … Mechanisms tell us how things happen: how actors relate,
how individuals come to believe what they do or what they draw from
past experiences, how policies and institutions endure or change, how
outcomes that are inefﬁcient become hard to reverse, and so on. (Falleti
and Lynch 2009: 1147)
Examples of causal mechanisms are power reproduction, learning mecha-
nisms, modes of change (layering, replacement, conversion, policy drift) and
similar means. Each type of causal mechanism may have subtypes. For
instance, power reproduction refers to the subtypes of boundary control in
institutional changes (to preserve from outsiders’ inﬂuence) or the circular
ﬂow of power through the politicisation of administrative structures. Some
mechanisms can be individually based, but most of them apply to collective
actors and collective action in social systems. Falleti and Lynch (2009:
1147) propose that mechanisms are ‘portable concepts, distinct from the
variables attached to particular cases’ that ‘operate in different contexts’.
Therefore, as ‘mechanisms interact with the contexts in which they operate,
the outcomes of the process cannot be determined a priori by knowing the
type of mechanism that is at work’. Contexts may be ‘multi-layered’ with
different dynamics: political, institutional and slow-moving background pro-
cesses (long-term transformation of population, markets, budgets, economy,
etc.). This article assumes that ‘most similar (Napoleonic) administrative
institutions’ are likely to generate similar causal mechanisms if we observe
both similar content in administrative reform policies and a similar ordering
of administration reform episodes. However, the differences in context
between France and Spain are used to explain why the same mechanisms
may operate differently.
Finally, the ‘administrative reform trajectory’ is used in the last section to
map global patterns of change in these two systems. Here, a national ‘adminis-
trative reform trajectory’ is considered to be a chain of temporarily ordered
administrative reform policies that have taken place since the early 1980s and
have affected various components of the administrative system with different
scope. The two ﬁrst dimensions are the content and time order (or ‘event
orderability’ (Abbott 1990)) of the different reform episodes. We ask whether
the content of administrative reform in both countries is common and to what
extent, and whether they appeared in the same or a different time order. A
third element of a trajectory is the extent to which these administrative reform
policies have been self-reinforcing (reproducing some historical common insti-
tutional arrangement) or reactive (trying to be ‘path-breaking’). In the latter
case, we ask whether reactive reforms developed their proper self-reinforcing
mechanisms so that their destabilising effects have been long lasting and dis-
ruptive. This is a general concern of Thelen (2003: 222) in proposing to offset
path-dependence theorists’ excessive emphasis on inertia while seeking to
‘understand the modes and mechanisms through which institutional evolution
and change occur’. Finally, a fourth element is the intersection between differ-
ent reform sequences. In many cases, change evolves in one sequence of
events in the same institutional arrangement (civil service, organisation or bud-
get) or the same broad institutions (i.e. the evolution of the welfare system, the
democratisation processes). However, in other accounts (Mahoney 2000; Orren
and Skowronek 1994), the interplay of two or more sequences is relevant for
explaining change. Our argument is that the global reform trajectory is condi-
tioned by the time in which reform initiatives took place and when different
reforms intersected, therefore generating self-reinforcing mechanisms or
reactive ones.
Mapping Similarities and Divergences in Contents and Timing
This section considers the variations in content and timing of reform trends in
both countries. Table 1 offers a broad overview of the similarities and differ-
ences observed in the two countries. The following subsections develop the
argument.
Decentralisation Policies as a First Move: The Dominance of Territorial
Issues in Napoleonic Systems
In the early 1980s, both France and Spain ﬁrst dealt with decentralisation
policies rather than focusing on efﬁciency or managerial tools like other
systems. The territorial decentralisation was a response to concerns about
the distribution of political power, not about administrative inefﬁciencies.
The mechanism at work was the ‘creation of power’ through decentralisa-
tion for the new majority or the elites of the new regime (see similarly,
Falleti 2007, 2010) by reinforcing the legitimacy, representativeness and the
power of subnational governments to achieve electoral and political support.
In France in 1981, the territorial decentralisation of the Lois Defferre
enhanced the status and power of local authorities and created a constitu-
tional and political counterbalance within the French regime (Le Lidec
2001). The reform was promoted by the new coalition government of the
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
Timing
Content Similar Divergent
Similar Decentralisation policies in the early
1980s
Attempts at reforming the corps system and the
civil service
Blocked games in reorganising state
local units in the 1980s and 1990s
Divergent Managerial reforms: Budget Act
(France) vs. agencies (Spain) in the
2000s
Reorganisation of state local units by mergers
in France (2007–2009) vs. drift and progressive
loss of relevance of state local units in Spain
socialist and communist parties that had been in opposition since the crea-
tion of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Mostly elected by local authorities when
right-wing parties controlled the national government from 1958 to 1981,
the new incumbents of the executive identiﬁed their cause as the one
defended by locally elected ofﬁcials (Le Lidec 2001). Using Falleti’s catego-
ries for causal mechanisms, the French decentralisation of the early 1980s
was ﬁrst (Law of 2 March 1982) a political decentralisation, which
devolved political authority to subnational actors and activated new or exist-
ing spaces for the representation of subnational polities (Falleti 2010: 38).
The 1982 Act abolished administrative controls over subnational authorities.
It reinforced their autonomy by granting the presidents of conseils généraux
(départements) and of conseils régionaux (regions) political authority and
powers that were previously exerted by the prefects. In a second move
(Law of 7 January 1983), power was transferred to local authorities in sev-
eral domains (social action, housing, education, culture, transport, maritime
affairs) but without clearly distinguishing between state and subnational
governments.
The Spanish decentralisation differs in context and in scope from the
French one. However, similar causal mechanisms are at work. The policy
of decentralisation also came as the ﬁrst major move. At ﬁrst, a strong
political decentralisation took place in the context of regime transition, and
this was followed by administrative decentralisation. The 1978 Constitution
granted political autonomy to local authorities and framed the creation of
politically autonomous regions. As in France, territorial decentralisation was
meant to respond to the demand for autonomy voiced by part of the oppo-
sition during Franco’s regime. Since then, most state powers have been
transferred to the autonomous regions and not to the local authorities. At
ﬁrst, the devolution of powers was asymmetrical and favoured some regions
over others. A more symmetrical devolution of power was achieved after
the 1992 autonomic pacts between the two major national political parties.
The administrative decentralisation policy, unlike that in France, provided
the regions with a higher proportion of power and resources, probably due
to the different context of democratisation and regime transition. A stronger
power coalition generated stronger and more systematic transfers of power
in Spain than in France. Finally, while the French government opted for a
local decentralisation that relied on the existing types of local authorities,
the Spanish government chose to create ex novo a quasi-federal system
(regional decentralisation).
To sum up, decentralisation policy was ﬁrst generated by a similar mecha-
nism of ‘power creation’ and activated by new elites carrying out a signiﬁcant
change and realignment of the political regime. The Napoleonic features of
France and Spain favoured centralisation and provided governments with
robust control tools by granting power to local prefects and providing central
ministries with direct inﬂuence over local issues through ministerial territorial
units. In both cases, decentralisation is ‘the’ major early ‘reactive’ reform that
induced reinforcing effects and changed the ‘Napoleonic’ state. In opposition
to the Napoleonic centralising feature, local representatives always played a
major role at the central level within Republican regimes in France and
obtained beneﬁts (Le Lidec 2001). In Spain, the demand for decentralisation
took more political and radical turns with regional movements that had
demanded autonomy since the late nineteenth century. Spain also managed to
provide the right to self-government to some regions during the Second
Republic (1931–1936).
As suggested by Falleti (2010: 232), ‘the sequence in which different
types of decentralisation policies (administrative, ﬁscal and political) unfold
over time is a key determinant of the evolution of the intergovernmental
balance of power’. In Spain, as political and administrative decentralisation
fused with a political dimension, we can conﬁrm Falleti’s statement that
political decentralisation is able to ‘generate a group of followers and
engender self-reinforcing policy ratchet effects that will further strengthen
the ability of subnational actors to negotiate more devolution of political
and ﬁscal authority’ (Falleti 2010: 232). In Spain, there was an ongoing
decentralisation process throughout the 1990s and 2000s through which
ﬁnancial resources and power were transferred. This process has resulted in
the negotiation of second-order regional constitutions in which the political
power of the regions has been enhanced (or attempted) (Colino 2009). In
France, several consequences derived from the decentralisation policies of
the period from 1982 to 1985. Firstly, interdependencies between the
national and local levels expanded because the decentralisation was not sys-
tematic and was therefore incomplete. The role of local authorities in public
policy was strengthened, as was their capacity to demand the further devo-
lution of political and ﬁscal authority. Supported by local politicians and
beneﬁting from the inﬂuence of local authorities in policy-making, decen-
tralisation remained high on the political agenda, as demonstrated by the
approval of a new decentralisation act in 2003. However, because adminis-
trative decentralisation remained partial and was not accompanied by ﬁscal
decentralisation (Le Lidec 2011), the power of the national executive over
subnational governments remained stronger than in Spain. The French state
may sanction (by punishing illegal activities), guide (by adjusting the level
of ﬁnancial aid) and promote local activities. At the same time, the state is
compelled to negotiate with local authorities that have more autonomous
decision-making power.
Restructuring the State Field Administration: Similar Blocking Games
In both countries, decentralisation policies impacted on the state ﬁeld adminis-
tration, as the centre tried to better coordinate services in the periphery. The
reorganisation of state territorial units was repeatedly put on the agenda in both
countries from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s but garnered little success due
to a repeated blocking game between three actors that each defended their own
institutional logic (sector ministries, prefects/government delegates and state
territorial units). The mechanism at work was linked to the attempt to repro-
duce the power of the centre in state ﬁeld administrations and the power of
individual ministries in their peripheral units to protect their own turf. More
speciﬁcally, the reproduction of power was translated into boundary control
(see Falleti and Lynch 2009). Boundary control was exerted with the aim of
defending the state ﬁeld administration from encroachment by outsiders, and it
triggered different games. The government tried to preserve the power of the
centre through their representatives, like the prefect, in the state ﬁeld adminis-
tration. Individual ministries tried to avoid this encroachment by protecting
their area of responsibility from the supervisory powers of the state representa-
tive. This mechanism was present in both countries, although with some differ-
ences.
State local representatives were historically important in both countries,
although they were more structured and powerful in France. The initial
French Napoleonic model created a local administrative organisation (depart-
ments), the prefects and sub-prefects (appointed state representatives in the
territory) and the mayors, initially appointed by central governments or pre-
fects. This structure was aimed at the development of more centralised
steering and relied on an (idealised) uniform and hierarchical administrative
model with the prefects as its cornerstone (Hayward and Wright 2002;
Wright 1992). Gradually, several laws granted prefects strong and broad
powers in political and public matters and power over local authorities. This
steering mechanism is simultaneously hierarchical (prefects have authority
over central state personnel and over local government) and political (they
are appointed by the head of the executive). From the early Third Republic,
however, the creation of many new sector ministries favoured the develop-
ment of a sector-based culture, which was fostered by (sector) specialised
corps of civil servants. Ministries gradually established their own territorial
network of local units without respect for the traditional prefectoral system,
organised by department (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010). These strategies reveal
both a distrust of ministries towards the policy principles upheld by prefects
and the desire to short-circuit them (Le Lidec 2006). The strategies also
reinforce interdependent relationships between central administrations, state
local units and local authorities. Furthermore, the cumul des mandates
allows an ofﬁcial to hold multiple elected ofﬁces in several levels of gov-
ernment that mediated by state, ministry and territorial interests (Grémion
1976; Le Lidec 2001).
In Spain, the 1812 Constitution, inspired by French revolutionary princi-
ples, attempted to set up a system with provinces and appointed goberna-
dores civiles as central government delegates in 1833 (García Madaria
1980). As in France, during some periods mayors were appointed by the
government (large cities) and by the gobernador civil (small cities). The
conception of uniformity was different in Spain. On the one hand, unlike
the French prefect, appointed gobernadores civiles did not belong to a
corps of civil servants, and they had power over public order and control
over local authorities. Further, the gobernador civil, whose name changed in
the 1980s to government under-delegate, was not placed at the head of the
state ﬁeld administration at its inception. Thus, the state ﬁeld administration
ﬂourished, as in France, as part of a ministerial strategy to deliver services
in the territory (Nieto 1977). On the other hand, the cumul des mandates is
far less important in the Spanish system. Therefore, any integration of cen-
tre and periphery was due to the role played by the gobernadores civiles.
In any case, there was the aspiration to centralise state structures in both
countries.
These state ﬁeld units and the role of the prefects were challenged in
both countries from the decentralisation policies of the early 1980s to the
2000s. The reorganisation of the territorial state and the redeﬁnition of the
position of prefects were repeatedly put on the agenda, but the games at
work in these reforms – opposing central ministries, state ministerial units,
prefects and local authorities – resulted in incremental reforms that were
barely implemented. After the ﬁrst French decentralisation act transferred
power and the staff of the health, social security and infrastructure minis-
tries to local authorities, state ﬁeld services became weak and highly frag-
mented. Simultaneously, the prefects also lost their dominance to local
authorities as a consequence of the devolution of power. A committee cre-
ated in 1982 to plan for the future of state local units and prefects was dis-
mantled without having made any decisions. In the late 1980s, the Ministry
of the Interior launched several initiatives without any real effects (Bezes
and Le Lidec 2010); the ATR Act (the guidance Law of 6 February, 1992
on the territorial administration of the Republic) and the accompanying
Devolution Charter aimed at better coordinating territorial services and
national policies under the authority of the prefect. From 1992 to the early
2000s, several strategic plans tried to reorganise the vertical chain of com-
mand in ministries and enhance the autonomy of the state ﬁeld services,
while strengthening the coordinating role of the prefect in the départements.
A report from the Cour des Comptes (2003) indicated that this reorganisa-
tion had been poorly implemented due to considerable opposition from the
ministries. In 2004, the French government created eight focal subject areas
in the regions while legally reinforcing the powers of prefects. State ﬁeld
services were placed under the authority of regional prefects with the objec-
tive of implementing a ‘nationwide territorial administrative framework’ and
granting more tools for the coordination and steering of local services. The
effects of this reform remained limited because it relied on weak incentives,
intersected with budgetary reforms initiated in 2001, and suffered from
incompatibilities with the new budgetary and managerial rules. Twenty years
after decentralisation, the two competing logistical systems of the French
state resisted reforms. The boundary control mechanism faced tension as a
consequence of two contradictory logistical systems: the horizontal coordina-
tion system defended by prefects and the Ministry of the Interior and the
vertical coordination system defended by ministries (Bezes and Le Lidec
2010). In these interactions, French local authorities supported state local
units.
The decentralisation process also triggered the reorganisation of Spanish
state ﬁeld services in several waves and with similar kinds of games. In
1977, three executive orders aimed at placing state ﬁeld services under the
authority of the governor. The regulations of 1981 and 1983 mandated the
double dependency of state ﬁelds, coordinated by the governor and func-
tionally dependent on sector ministries, which weakened the coordination
capacity of the governor (Castells 1995). The governor only had hierarchical
powers on public order and the possibility to abolish a local authority that
transgressed the law. With the creation of the autonomous communities, the
government delegates (Law 16 November 1983) were placed as government
representatives in the regions. Like French regional prefects, they coordinate
provincial government representatives, are responsible for interprovincial
state ﬁeld services and represent the government in the regions. All these
roles, with the exception of the last one, have been rather formal. The gov-
ernment delegate lacks the administrative machinery to coordinate services,
and the relationship with autonomous communities is monopolised by the
staff of the central ministries through intergovernmental bodies. Between
1997 and 1999, the 6/1997 Act and other executive orders (again) placed
all state ﬁeld services under the authority of government representatives as
a proof that previous attempts had not been successful. In 2003, only 5.5
per cent of staff from ministerial local units were placed under government
delegates (MAP 2005), which illustrates the failure of trying to strengthen
government representatives.
From the early 1980s to the 2000s, both countries experienced paradoxical
situations (the reorganisation of the state local units and the prefects/govern-
ment delegates) with the same mechanism at work (boundary control as
reﬂected in cross-cutting gamesmanship among various veto players: state rep-
resentatives, state ﬁelds units, central ministries) resulting in status quo or
modest changes. The prefectoral system represents a Napoleonic logic: a
political role representing the state, accountability to the executive and
adapting speciﬁc territorial demands of local politicians and constituents. How-
ever, the historical legacy is not just ‘Napoleonic’. There is also a ‘Republican’
legacy since the Third Republic (1871) that was characterised by the emergent
tendency for ministries to expand their power through the development of min-
isterial local units.
If content and mechanisms have been rather similar, then some differ-
ences are linked to context. The Spanish government delegate has been
transformed into a less powerful actor than the French prefect because he
was perceived as the legacy of an authoritarian regime (Franco), not of an
administrative model (Napoleonic). Spanish state local units were as impor-
tant as French local units until power was transferred to the regions. This
transfer dismantled many services provided by the state ﬁeld administration.
Finally, distinct from the Spanish example, Sarkozy’s General Review of
Public Policies (RGPP) in France helped to strengthen the state regional
level by merging 23 ministerial regional directorates into eight directorates
whose boundaries match those of the new ‘large ministries’. At the depart-
mental level, the organisation of state services was solidiﬁed with the crea-
tion of three inter-ministerial directorates that uniﬁed a dozen existing
ministerial directorates and departed from the logic of ministerial boundaries
(Bezes and Le Lidec 2010). Prefects were simultaneously reinforced. The
regional prefect is now considered the guarantor of cohesion and the coordi-
nator and mediator of state inter-ministerial action. Regional prefects have
gained stronger formal power over the eight regional units and over other
ministerial services. Furthermore, the regional prefect now has authority over
departmental prefects, except with respect to public order. This reform did
not dismantle France’s ‘Napoleonic’ orientation. It reactivated some of its
logics (the prefect and the political chain of command, the territorial dimen-
sion of the state) but also redirected its main institutions through a process
of institutional conversion (Thelen 2003: 228) by giving new orientations to
their developments (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010). The regional merged units
now include multi-policies and multi-sectors; the department level is inter-
ministerial; the roles of the prefects have partly changed at both levels. In
Spain, there has been no reinforcement of government delegates, and this
Napoleonic feature is being dismantled. In the Spanish case, the mode of
institutional change was more similar to a process of drift (Mahoney Thelen
2010: 17) when the impact of an institution weakens as a result of shifts in
external conditions. Here, radical decentralisation gradually alters the power
and the substance of government delegates.
Similar Content but Different Timing of Civil Service Reforms
The two Napoleonic countries are characterised by what Bernard Silberman
(1993: 10) has called an ‘organisationally oriented civil service’. An organi-
sationally oriented civil service means the following: (i) early commitment
to a bureaucratic career during the educational process; (ii) organisational
boundaries that structure early commitments (speciﬁc university training in
law or engineering or speciﬁc civil service schools for top civil servants
like the French Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) or the Spanish
National Institute of Public Administration (INAP)); and (iii) an integrated
internal labour market channelled by departments but dominated by ‘corps’
that are ministerial (diplomats, etc.), inter-ministerial (civil administrators in
both countries) or related to controlling bodies (Cour des comptes, inspec-
tion des ﬁnances, or tax inspectors in Spain). The corps is a robust struc-
turing element in both countries as the entry point to civil service and is
inﬂuential in the career and rewards of its members. However, two institu-
tional differences are apparent. The ﬁrst is that the Spanish INAP plays a
minor role in recruiting top civil servants compared to the ENA. The sec-
ond is that Spanish grands corps enjoyed signiﬁcant inﬂuence under the
authoritarian Francoist regime in the absence of democratic competition and
political parties (Alba 1997).
There are two different types of mechanisms regarding this area of pol-
icy. On the one hand, there is again a mechanism for power reproduction
but it is expressed in a different way than the aforementioned reform. The
power reproduction triggered a power struggle to control the upper echelons
of the administrative hierarchy between political parties and corps of civil
servants. This is illustrated by the politicisation of the apex through political
appointments, the strengthening of ministerial cabinets and the attempt to
reduce the power of grand corps. This mechanism operated similarly and
simultaneously in both countries. On the other hand, another mechanism at
work is related to organisational inertia (positive feedback) whereby the
staff of the whole state (central, local and regional level and in any policy
sector) should be covered by the same umbrella legislation (civil service
statute). This generic positive feedback is translated into organisational iner-
tia characterised by a homogeneity and uniformity of the conditions under
which public sector employees are managed. The dynamic at stake is that
institutions and policies – here, the civil service statute created for state
agents – endure by creating their own constituencies and expanding their
scope. This mechanism is especially important after processes of decentrali-
sation. Although these mechanisms were similar in both countries, the tim-
ing differed considerably.
The problem posed by the civil service was framed similarly in both coun-
tries, although each has a different scope. In France in 1981 and in Spain in
1982, newly elected left-wing parties held discussions about the civil service
and its problems (Bezes 2009; Villoria and Huntoon 2003). The main issue
was the loyalty of higher civil servants to political masters in a context where
a completely (Spain) or partially (France) new political regime was established.
Grands corps members were viewed by the socialist and communist parties as
representatives of the privileged class and were thus potentially disloyal civil
servants of the new government. In Spain, this mechanism was ampliﬁed due
to the major inﬂuence of the grand corps in the Francoist regime and during
the transition (1976–1981). In both countries, but more intensively in Spain,
the aims of professionalising the administrative system and reducing the power
of the specialised corps were key. In both cases, these questions were not dis-
connected from the parallel policies of decentralisation that would most likely
introduce new conditions of employment, careers and status while fragmenting
the civil service.
The two countries initially addressed the issue of loyalty similarly but
developed reforms of the civil service with a few notable differences. Spain
initiated an early disruptive reform and decided to pass broad basic legislation
on the civil service and on the incompatibilities of civil servants in 1984 (Gal-
lego 2003; Parrado 2011a), while France initially developed a more protective
framework and passed a series of laws that homogenised the rights and duties
of all civil servants (13 July 1983), rationalised the statutory conditions of state
public agents (11 January 1984) and created new homogeneous conditions for
civil servants of subnational governments (Bezes 2009). More path-breaking
reforms came later on in France.
In Spain, the Civil Service Act of 1984 attempted to weaken the power of
the grand corps by establishing a post system that had more relevance than
corps membership for career and reward purposes, by restricting the ‘auto-
matic’ allocation of some posts to a particular corps, by merging corps (similar
initiative in France came much later; Rouban 2008 see below) and by introduc-
ing a formal system of performance-based payment. However, the power of
the corps was unaffected, as the effects of these laws remained limited. The
new government then reactivated another ‘Napoleonic’ feature, the politicisa-
tion of bureaucracy through the creation of new posts with political appoint-
ments (Cejudo 2006) and through the strengthening of ministerial cabinets
(Parrado 2004). This evolution was sometimes considered a return to the spoils
system (Alba 2001). With the advent of democracy, political parties presented
a real challenge to corps power by reducing the monopoly that the corps had
on the bureaucratic machinery during the Francoist regime, although they
remained inﬂuential.
The main objectives of the three pieces of legislation enacted in 1983–
1984 revealed France’s distinct strategy. The rationalisation of the legal sta-
tut général des fonctionnaires through a systematic rewriting and its ability
to extend to local ofﬁcials and health services was one strategy to assure
the loyalty of the civil service. Whereas the Spanish government chose to
introduce new principles of ﬂexibility with a managerial ﬂavour, the ﬁrst
1983 Act reasserted the historical norms and values of the French civil ser-
vice to produce loyalty: career-based civil service, political neutrality, self-
regulation as a condition to loyalty and others. The three laws were also a
consequence of decentralisation. The extension of the guarantees of state
bureaucrats to local and health service public agents was granted in
exchange for political support of decentralisation policies (Bezes 2009).
Although common principles were claimed, the local civil service was reor-
ganised with somewhat distinct features. A limited degree of democratisation
with regard to entry in the ENA also took place to circumvent the inﬂuence
of the grands corps. However, as in Spain, these initiatives did not break
existing institutional arrangements. As a consequence, and relying on a sim-
ilar mechanism observed in Spain, the victory of the left-wing parties led to
the reinforcement of existing ‘Napoleonic’ ‘politicisation’ mechanisms.
Recruitment to ministerial cabinets and the use of discretionary power to
appoint top positions had been extended since the 1980s (Bezes and Le
Lidec 2007). The power base of the grands corps remained unaltered
because political parties did not embody the same symbolic signiﬁcance of
renewal as in the Spanish democratic transition.
In both countries, initial choices (distinct on the civil service; similar on
politicization) resulted in similar effects until the 2000s, namely the lack of a
departure from historical administrative institutions (the corps system) and the
activation and reinforcement of politicisation. It is then signiﬁcant that civil
service issues were put again on the agenda in both countries in the 2000s,
and new initiatives in favour of managerialisation have only recently been
introduced but mixed, in Spain, with the harmonisation of different staff
regimes due to decentralization, an issue France addressed in the early 1980s.
In both cases, however, the institutions of the civil service were only gradually
transformed while politicization remained robust.
In France, the merger of the corps into a limited number of larger occu-
pational deﬁnitions appeared in 2002 due to the growing inﬂuence of the
local civil service model and the model of private ﬁrms (Rouban 2008;
Gervais 2010; Bezes and Jeannot 2011). The creation of job-based frame-
works (as in health, security, social, ﬁnancial administration, culture, training
and general management) was discussed from 2002 to 2005 but was never
transformed into legislation and was ultimately abandoned. More restric-
tively, numerous mergers of medium-level corps occurred, but the reluctance
of grand corps to merge prevented any major impact. Other NPM instru-
ments were introduced, but the effects are difﬁcult to evaluate. From 2004,
the government experimented with incentive payments and extended them to
all directorates in 2006, but there is no evidence that performance pay has
gone beyond increasing the wages of top civil servants. Although they were
initially related to the decentralisation policy of the 1980s, recent civil ser-
vice reforms have been linked to the managerial and budgetary reforms of
the 2001 Budget Act (Loi organique relative aux lois de ﬁnances – LOLF)
(Bezes 2010; Corbett 2010). By 2007, the newly elected President Sarkozy
advocated for the abolition of the corps to develop a job-based civil service
with a strong emphasis on mobility. Such a service would be inter-ministe-
rial among the three civil services (state, local authorities, hospitals) and
would offer ﬁnancial incentives to leave the civil service. This overarching
goal has only resulted in incremental changes. Gradual reforms tried to
facilitate mobility between administrations and civil services (Chevallier
2010; Law of 3 August 2009 on mobility) and continued to favour smooth
mergers rather than the abolition of historical institutions. Politicisation
mechanisms have even been reinforced by other means; that is, through the
reorganisation and merger of structures (Bezes and Le Lidec 2011).
Recent reforms in Spain addressed a different problem that is closer to
the issue raised in France by the decentralisation policy of the early 1980s.
In 2007, a civil service statute was launched to harmonise different staff
regimes across sector’s territories. Furthermore, the statute introduced more
managerial instruments for human resources. It consolidates some aspects of
previous legislation, such as the use of performance-related payment, which
has been reservedly practised in some agencies (Parrado 2008). In sum,
both countries addressed the fragmentation of the civil service caused by
decentralisation with the launch of a civil service statute but with different
timing: France (1983, 1984) and Spain (2007). The late arrival of the civil
service statute in Spain can be partially explained because in 1984 (when
the Civil Service Act was launched), central government elites did not
expect that the transfer of power to the regions would be as profound as it
has been.
Different Routes but Similar Timing to Performance Management: Budgetary
Reform vs. Agenciﬁcation
A focus on results, rather than inputs or activities, is a central concern of the
NPM reforms developed by many countries. Two interrelated aspects have
been developed internationally: the use of performance management for steer-
ing the bureaucracy and an organisational split between policy delivery and
decision-making. This section examines how managerialist ideas have been
introduced in France and Spain since the 1990s. A common feature is the late
diffusion of these policies albeit with varied choices in each case.
Initially, both countries tried unsuccessfully to implement a version of the
American planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) in the 1970s
and were reluctant to introduce new managerial tools in the 1980s. In the mid-
1980s, the French Budget Division introduced cutback management and other
instruments, such as the freeze on expenditures and the centralised budgetary
regulation of ministries. In 1989, the ‘Public Service Renewal’ (PSR) policy
developed internal contractualisation based on voluntary commitments from
bureaus. The policy gave directors greater operational ﬂexibility in exchange
for a commitment to set up management control systems and achieve agreed-
upon objectives. The evolution was rather similar in Spain. From 1976 to
1979, the Spanish PPBS focused on the instrumental improvement of planning
techniques to assess public investment before resources were allocated and to
provide a cost–beneﬁt analysis of programmes in the area of public works and
infrastructures (Ballart and Zapico 2010). According to these authors, the phase
of 1984–1994 was marked by a form of programme budgeting that required
each programme to have objectives and indicators. However, this reform failed
because programmes were too broadly deﬁned, managers were not trained to
establish objectives and indicators, and programme budgeting did not support
more strategic management.
Since the early 2000s, the route of managerialisation differed in both coun-
tries in terms of content, context and the mechanisms at work. In the French
administration, performance management instruments were extensively diffused
because of the 2001 Budget Act. Simultaneously, and contrary to the agenciﬁ-
cation reform of other countries such as Spain, the French government opted
for systematic mergers in 2007–2009.
In France, the incremental budgetary reforms of the 1990s and the path-
breaking 2001 Act introduced changes in the control and accountability of
public authorities and individual managers through performance indicators.
Because the instruments of the 1970s did not help the country to overcome
the economic recession of 1991–1993, the French Budget Directorate incre-
mentally experimented with managerial tools to alter the relationship
between the central administration and devolved services. The following ini-
tiatives were adopted: ‘aggregated headings’ intended to give ministerial
managers latitude in how to (re)allocate appropriations; contractualisation
between central administrations, state local units and the Budget Directorate
was experimented with, and more control over spending at the territorial
level was adopted. However, it is only the 2001 Budget Act that systema-
tised these instruments to create a lever for further reforms. LOLF estab-
lished programme-oriented budgets, a new performance management system,
a ‘real cost’ approach to policy and a new accountability framework for
parliament. Whereas the reforms initially aimed to restore the balance of
power between government and parliament by giving MPs more control
over the budgetary process, the managerial instruments, set up by LOLF,
enhanced control within the executive. The reforms reasserted executive
control over ministries and over many autonomous bodies (établissements
publics). Organisational changes came in 2007, with a choice of mergers at
the central and local levels and with links to the imperatives of the debt
and deﬁcit. First, the Fillon government redrew the ministerial boundaries in
2007 while signiﬁcantly reducing the number of full ministers with the cre-
ation of large ministries. Second, the government merged several central
directorates within ministries, such as the creation of the ‘Pole Emploi’ or
the General Directorate of Public Finances in 2008, with other examples to
follow in 2009. This movement was reinforced with mergers of the territo-
rial state administration at the regional and départmental levels (Bezes and
Le Lidec 2010, 2011).
The mechanism for introducing a more results-oriented culture is different
in the Spanish context. In Spain, the content of budgetary reforms was less rel-
evant for managerial modernisation (Ballart and Zapico 2010) than in France.
The period from 1994 to 2006 was marked by a zero deﬁcit goal through bud-
get stability laws, which allowed for a balanced budget by 2000 and budget
surpluses between 2005 and 2007. In 2001 and 2006, budgetary legislation
was enacted to link the stability of surpluses and deﬁcits to the economic
cycle. More ﬁnancial than managerial, this phase tried to demonstrate Spain’s
ﬁnancial credibility to adopt the euro. The overlapping phase from 2003 to
2008 focused on performance management. The General Budget Law of 2003
emphasised budgeting by results and included some principles of micro-man-
agement, but they are of far less relevance than the managerial instruments
promoted by LOLF. Performance management was introduced through
organisational design.
A results-oriented culture was introduced through an organisational law.
The 2006 Law promoted the creation of more autonomous agencies with the
aim of increasing the quality of public services and fostering management by
results through the use of framework contracts between the parent ministry and
the agency. In the future, any new autonomous entity should adopt the agency
model and be steered by framework contracts. The 2006 Act was another
attempt to streamline the variety of state units with autonomous or semi-auton-
omous status from central ministries. In the past, laws like the 6/1997 Act
failed to achieve more uniformity in this area because in 2006, 47 public enti-
ties out of 138 had a distinct legal regime. The 2006 Act aimed to reduce the
number of different semi-autonomous entities while putting a greater emphasis
on performance management.
Spain started the systematic agenciﬁcation of its central administration
15 years later than in other countries, although the budgetary Law of 2011
‘temporarily’ banned the creation of state agencies due to ﬁscal constraints
(Parrado 2011b). The State Agencies Law only had a limited effect on the
diffusion of managerial tools although it was intended to exchange manage-
rial autonomy for management control through performance contracts.
Whereas the French government linked budgetary reform and managerial
concerns, the introduction of performance management in Spain was sus-
tained more by an organisational act than by a budgetary law. Furthermore,
some autonomous entities, like the tax administration or social security, had
results-oriented cultures since the mid-1990s through a ‘layering’ process
without the need for a special organisational law (Parrado 2008). What dif-
ferences in mechanism or context can explain these divergences in nature
and scope?
The economic and ﬁscal context, similar in both countries, is not an
explanation: France and Spain experienced a strong recession in 1993,
adopted the euro in 2002 after tightening public expenditures and have suf-
fered from an economic recession since 2008. Similarly, both systems had
to cope with devolved services, but in Spain, the transfer of services and
the sharing of public expenditures with the regions was far greater, espe-
cially when health and education were transferred in 2002. However, the
three mechanisms operated differently. The ﬁrst is the signiﬁcant involve-
ment of the Ministry of Finance in managerialism. In France, budgetary
concerns have not only tried to improve the health of public ﬁnances
through macroeconomic measures but they have also helped to introduce a
results culture. Since 2005, the French Ministry of Finance has become the
dominant player in state reform in France, replacing a conﬁguration in
which three ministries (Budget, Civil Service and Interior) competed and
attempted to impose their reform models (Bezes 2009). By contrast, mana-
gerial reforms in Spain were introduced by the then Ministry of Public
Administration through organisational reforms (agenciﬁcation among them),
which favoured a legal orientation and a loose articulation to budgetary
concerns. In Spain, the Ministry of Economy has been concerned with
macro-level public ﬁnances and did not really attempt to control the budget
through micro-measures. The Ministry of Economy has been consulted on
organisational reforms, as it is involved in any legislative initiative, but its
role is to keep public expenditures under control. Furthermore, the Ministry
of Economy was involved in controlling the seven created agencies, but its
involvement has been rather formal (Parrado 2011b).
The second distinct mechanism relates to the role of parliament in budget-
ary reforms. The Spanish Parliament was not involved in budgetary reforms,
apart from endorsing and eventually discussing the draft law from the execu-
tive. At the opposite, LOLF was a consequence of the control that the French
Parliament wanted to exert over public expenditures and the executive. A
cross-party working group from the National Assembly was established in
1998 with this purpose. This search for control was supported by several mem-
bers of the cabinets of the Prime Minister and Budget Minister and a few
senior civil servants from the Ministry of Finance.
Finally, it is striking that France chose organisational mergers instead of
agenciﬁcation, as in Spain. The mechanisms at stake may offer some explana-
tions of this divergence. In France, mergers have been undertaken for contra-
dictory reasons (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010): achieving economies of scale,
solving internal conﬂicts and reinforcing coordination through hierarchical con-
trol. To some extent, it seems that the more systematic creation of agencies
reﬂects the weaker strength of integrative and centripetal dynamics within the
Spanish state and the stronger role of decentralisation trends.
Institutions, Timing and Intersections: The Logics of Reproduction and
Change in the Administrative Reform Trajectories of Napoleonic States
This article has explored the DNA of diverse administrative reform episodes in
France and Spain by focusing on the content of the reforms, their timing and
sequence. The three dimensions have a considerable impact on the transforma-
tive effects of reform policies and on the institutionalisation of changes. They
also reﬂect the inﬂuence and constraints of existing historical administrative
institutions. Causal mechanisms are very helpful for comparing administrative
reforms. The link between the same mechanisms and different contexts in two
similar Napoleonic countries help to account for institutional changes. In this
concluding section, we ﬁrst take up the main comparative ﬁndings by paying
speciﬁc attention to dominant content but also to the time dimension and the
potential effects of intersections between trends. Second, we discuss the extent
to which Napoleonic historical institutions have been inﬂuential but have also
been challenged in recent reforms.
Content, Timing, Intersections and Causal Mechanisms
The global administrative reform trajectories in France and Spain offer two
statements. First, a similar critical juncture was present in the late 1970s in
Spain and in the early 1980s in France, initiating a signiﬁcant reactive and
path-breaking sequence though decentralisation policies. In the early 1980s,
both countries began to redraw the boundaries between the centre and the
territories by creating and decentralising power to local or regional authori-
ties. In both cases, political reasons, not administrative efﬁciency, informed
the decisions. Decentralisation clearly shows a departure from the Napole-
onic model. However, decentralisation progressed differently in each country.
In France, uniformity was maintained in the process of decentralisation and
the transfer of power. In Spain, local and regional autonomies were treated
differently. Local authorities were given autonomy, but they did not beneﬁt
from the transfer of resources and power, as had the regions. Furthermore,
Spanish regional decentralisation has been heterogeneous because some
regions initially received more power than others. Second, a focus on
results through performance management and new organisational choices
(agenciﬁcation or mergers) were only developed in the 2000s (contrary to
the United Kingdom for instance), although in different ways in each coun-
try. Performance management was introduced in France in a systematic way
with the 2001 Budget Act; whereas in Spain, its introduction was more
fragmented and was linked to the development of agencies. In both coun-
tries, the creation of quasi-autonomous bodies had followed a gradual ad
hoc trend linked to speciﬁc policy contexts because no overall administra-
tive logic or strategy was established. However, in 2006 Spain began to
develop a more systematic effort towards agenciﬁcation with regard to its
central administration but was forced to halt the process in 2011 due to the
budgetary crisis. In France, a very distinct organisational choice was made
in 2007 that favoured ‘mergers’ (and not agenciﬁcation) for its central
administration and state local units (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010).
Timing and intersections are important with regard to the early reforms that
conditioned later reforms. With respect to intersections and the effects of inter-
action, two similar groups of administrative reform policies emerged in both
countries: on the one hand, decentralisation and its effects on the reorganisa-
tion of state local units and civil service reforms; on the other hand, perfor-
mance management concerns and reorganisation choices at the national and
central levels.
Decentralisation was the ﬁrst major reform movement in both countries
and had a considerable domino effect in each case. Decentralisation placed
new administrative reform issues on the governmental agenda, the most impor-
tant of which were the reorganisation of state local units, civil service reforms
and ﬁnancial relationships between the state and subnational governments.
Decentralisation then intersected with other policies. However, decentralisation
did not systematically disrupt the historical components of these policies. The
disruptive effects of decentralisation were counterbalanced by resilient adminis-
trative and institutional features. Rather, in both countries, decentralisation poli-
cies acted as a trigger for a layering process of global institutional change
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2003); the new rules guiding the division
of tasks, power and staff and the emergence of a distinct civil service brought
indirect changes by gradually altering the dominant centralised logic of the
Napoleonic bureaucracies while other dimensions remained resilient, as
illustrated below.
Firstly, the reorganisation of state ﬁeld units and the repositioning of pre-
fects/government delegates were slow processes in both France and Spain from
the 1980s to the 2000s. Both countries have followed the same ‘Napoleonic’
self-reinforcing sequence. On the one hand, initiatives were developed to
strengthen the government representatives in the periphery by placing ministe-
rial ﬁeld units under their responsibility (Spain) or reinforcing their authority
on these state territorial units (France). On the other hand, ministerial depart-
ments resisted the encroachment of government representatives by preserving
their turf. This balance of power was less crucial in Spain than in France
because decentralisation was more radical in the Spanish context. Decentralisa-
tion challenged the historical organisation of the territorial state in both coun-
tries. One cannot say, however, that decentralisation policies ‘caused’ the
reorganisation of local units. The issue was perhaps more successfully tackled
in 2007–2009 by President Sarkozy. It was at this time that reforms were
launched due to both the budgetary crisis and a new coalition of reformers that
involved the Presidency, the Prime Minister, the Budget Directorate, the State
Modernisation Directorate and the Ministry of the Interior, all of which decided
to drastically merge state local units (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010).
Secondly, in both countries decentralisation indirectly challenged the civil
service through staff transfers and the creation of an alternative model of
recruiting, training and promoting public agents, which was distinct from the
dominant corps system, at least in France. Reforms have tried to reduce the
heterogeneity of civil service statutes (teaching, health, central administration,
local administration) and the proliferation of corps. However, the intersection
of this sequence with decentralisation differs in both countries. In Spain, the
‘effective’ intersection between civil service reform and the territorial
devolution of power did not take place until 2007, when a general statute regu-
lated civil servants of different functional ﬁelds (health, education, central
administration) and of different territorial levels. In 2007, the merger of frag-
mented groups of civil servants was not a crucial issue in Spain, which con-
ﬁrms the strength of its decentralisation. In the early 80s, many groups in
France defended the (virtual but symbolic) idea of integration of different civil
service statutes. The placement of staff from the central and local levels and
health administration under the same umbrella (general civil service statute)
was approved in 1983–1984 in reaction to decentralisation in France. This con-
cern for maintaining a form of symbolic integration reﬂects a persistent con-
cern for uniformity in the French context. However, the state civil service and
its features, as a general model, are in decline as the attributes of the local civil
service become increasingly appealing. At the same time, neither Spain nor
France has really attempted to entirely abolish the corps, and the reform initia-
tives were not related to decentralisation but were linked to human resource
management concerns. In both countries, there have been attempts at merging
the corps through a layering process aimed at weakening their power base and
structuring effects on human resources issues. In both countries, grand corps
remained unaffected.
The second set of interactions and intersections between trends of adminis-
trative reforms refer to ‘focus on results’/performance and design choices for
public organisations. In both countries, NPM reforms of agenciﬁcation and per-
formance management originated in speciﬁc mechanisms and were not initially
linked to the three other reform sequences. However, in both cases, they devel-
oped a distinct kind of spillover effect on other administrative reform policies.
In France, while the Civil Service Ministry had a strong legacy in taking
responsibility for administrative reforms during the 1990s, an unexpected coali-
tion, composed of budgetary authorities and the parliament, played a disruptive
role in the evolution of administrative changes in the 2001 Budget Act. In
Spain, managerial changes were promoted by a weaker reform group com-
posed of ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Public Administration. Budgetary
authorities only controlled excessive expenditures derived from reforms. In
both countries, agencies were originally developed on an ad hoc basis, but
Spain experienced a more systematic agenciﬁcation process from 2006
onwards.
The spill-over effects of these reforms were different. In France, the
path-breaking LOLF was a relevant step in initiating a new sequence in which
managerial tools and budgetary frames would steer other changes: new forms
of managerial steering, more devolution in personnel policies, and more differ-
entiated career and pay structures through the use of performance-related pay.
Performance pay was experimented with in 2004 and extended to all general
directorates in 2006. From 2002, LOLF triggered other reactions by reorganis-
ing state ﬁeld units in favour of prefects. In 2007, these projects were fully
implemented through mergers. By contrast, performance management reform
in Spain did not produce spillover effects in the rest of the system, limiting the
effects of reform to organisational structure.
In sum, the two Napoleonic systems favoured many sequential reforms (in
seriatim) and had solid veto points and difﬁculties in coping with parallel
major changes (True et al. 1999). They experienced less domino or spill-over
effects between reform trends than did other countries.
The Logics of Reproduction and Change: Are the French and Spanish
Administrative Systems Still Napoleonic?
The initial and dominant trend of decentralising reforms presents a consider-
able departure from two Napoleonic features: centralisation and uniformity.
By giving local authorities more power and autonomy, the normative ideal
of a chain of command that descends from the executive to local mayors
through prefects/government representatives has been broken down. This
reform relied on the same mechanism in each country. In both countries,
local/regional elites and local governments, historically bound by Napoleonic
institutions, obtained important state powers. The scope and degree of
decentralisation varied considerably between the two countries, as the choice
for a quasi-federal system was present only in Spain (regional decentralisa-
tion), while the French government opted for a local decentralisation with
a more limited transfer of power and autonomy. The distinct character of
each case of decentralisation seems crucial in explaining the divergences in
the long-term reform trajectories of these two ‘Napoleonic’ models. Simply
put, regional decentralisation triggered challenging effects for the ‘Napole-
onic’ Spanish system, whereas local decentralisation in France has not fully
reversed its ‘Napoleonic’ nature.
Similar blocking mechanisms engrained in the Napoleonic model pre-
vented the reform of state ﬁeld administrations. In both countries, common
conﬁgurations of veto players (state representatives, state ﬁelds units, central
ministries), historically set up by ‘Napoleonic logic’ (prefects) and opposed
by Republican ministerial developments (autonomous expansion of ministe-
rial local units), resulted in status quo for reforming state ﬁeld administra-
tions. However, in the ‘exceptional’ context of the Sarkozy presidency,
along with a ﬁnancial crisis, strong leadership and a new government coali-
tion, French state local units were drastically reformed through mergers and
the reinforcement of prefects (Bezes and Le Lidec 2010). This reform gen-
erated a hybrid model. On the one hand, it gave new inter-ministerial roles
to existing institutions like state local units and prefects (institutional con-
version). On the other hand, it also rediscovered and reactivated the ‘Napo-
leonic’ logic of prefects and a political hierarchy. Similarly, the structuring
feature of the civil service – the corps system and the privileges and auton-
omy of the grand corps – opposed many reform attempts and constrained
their design by limiting their objectives and scope. This reactive sequence
favoured the maintenance and extension of another Napoleonic feature: the
use of politicisation mechanisms.
Agencies and performance management were not part of the original
Napoleonic administrative system. They were not introduced through the
same channels in each country and did not beneﬁt from the same support
coalitions. The Spanish government was more inclined to accept trends
towards agenciﬁcation, whereas French reformers put a greater emphasis on
hierarchy and control through managerial techniques in the steering of pub-
lic organisations, including semi-autonomous entities like the établissements
publics. It seems that the budgetary reforms in France that had managerial
consequences have a stronger impact on other trends than the unsystematic
organisational changes that were experienced in Spain. The reinforcing
effects of these two trends have been different. First, France did not experi-
ence a quasi-federal evolution like Spain. Second, a systematic performance
management system was established after the 2001 Budget Act. Conse-
quently, the newly introduced managerial tools have been used to reinforce
the centralising mechanisms already at work within France and have simul-
taneously reinforced previous ‘Napoleonic’ hierarchical means of steering
and control. By contrast, no reinforcing effects were observed in the Span-
ish case, a context in which decentralisation led to federalism. Due to the
weak introduction of performance instruments within agencies, no vertical
reinforcement of steering capacities took place, and Spain is now more frag-
mented than before. We can conclude that Napoleonic components were less
resilient in Spain than in France. By considering administrative reforms in
time and sequences, this article hopes to offer new opportunities to develop
comparative perspectives of public administration.
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